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It’s Elementary 





More Trouble for the New York State Education Finance System 
On December 10, 2013, the New York State Tax Relief Commission issued its final 
report and recommendations.  These recommendations were immediately embraced by Governor 
Cuomo.  Sadly, however, these recommendations continue the assault on New York’s education 
finance system that was initiated by George Pataki, a co-chair of the commission, when he was 
governor and continued by Governor Cuomo’s own policies.   
 
The commission’s main proposal, which has a price tag of $1 billion, is to grant 
homeowners a property tax rebate for any increase in property taxes, so long as their jurisdiction 
does not override the 2 percent limit on property tax levy increases championed by Governor 
Cuomo and implemented in 2011. 
 
It is difficult for me to figure out how anyone could come up with such a misguided and 
unfair proposal. 
 
 It is anti-democratic.  Homeowners in jurisdictions where 60 percent of the voters believe 
that they need an increase in property taxes beyond 2 percent will receive a large financial 
punishment from the state. 
 
 It is profoundly unfair to children and homeowners in poor school districts.1  A key 
feature of the New York education finance system is that poor districts receive a much smaller 
share of their revenue from the property tax than do rich districts. A few wealthy downstate 
suburbs collected over $30,000 per pupil in local revenue in 2011-12, for example, whereas the 
Upstate Big Three (Buffalo, Rochester, and Syracuse) collected about $3,700.  Thus, a rebate 
equal to the maximum allowable tax increase of 2 percent would equal $600 per pupil in these 
wealthy suburbs but only $74 in the upstate big three.  New York’s education finance system 
already cheats the state’s poor districts.2  Why would any reasonable politician support a 
proposal to cheat them even more? 
 
It is profoundly unfair to renters and to high-renter school districts.  The STAR property 
tax exemption program provides property tax relief to homeowners. Because STAR exemptions 
do not apply to renters (and because of the equally unfair Sales Price Differential Factor, SPDF, 
which is discussed below), STAR payments per pupil are already over 5 times as high in low-
1 The tax cap and the new proposals apply to all jurisdictions, not just school districts.  This column 
focuses mainly on the school-district component. 
 
2 See my column for November 2013 at: http://cpr.maxwell.syr.edu/efap/about_efap/ie/Nov13.pdf . 
                                                 
renter downstate small suburbs as in the high-renter Upstate Big Three.  Again, why would any 
reasonable politician want to make this anti-renter bias even worse? 
 
Although it discourages a few jurisdictions from increasing property taxes by more than 2 
percent, it promotes inefficiency by giving voters in every other jurisdiction an incentive to 
support the 2 percent maximum property tax increase for two years.  What voter, if fully 
informed, would turn town a 2 percent increase in spending paid for by the state?  This 
inefficiency might even last for years if elected officials find it difficult to let these rebates 
disappear. 
 
It tries to force unproven types of governmental reorganization.  Under the commissions’ 
proposal, homeowners would receive the property tax rebates in the second year “only if they 
reside in jurisdictions that take meaningful concrete steps toward finding structural savings by 
sharing services with other jurisdictions or consolidating governments in their entirety.”  These 
types of reorganization may sometimes be cost-effective, but little is known about the possible 
savings and they are clearly not appropriate in many circumstances.3  Moreover, this provision 
penalizes large districts, where opportunities for this type of reorganization are much more 
limited.  
 
It does not address the property tax burden in the long run.  It is a $1 billion gift focused 
on homeowners in wealthy districts that disappears in two years.  In fact, by encouraging 
spending up to the tax cap, this proposal might result in property tax increases when the rebates 
disappear. 
  
Perhaps I should not be surprised by this proposal.  When he was governor, after all, 
George Pataki pushed through the STAR program, which gives no relief to renters and which, 
thanks to the SPDF, gives much higher exemptions to homeowners in rich districts than in poor 
districts.  As I have documented elsewhere, the SPDF is one of the most unfair tax provisions 
ever designed by a state government.4  This new rebate proposal is just more of the same.5  
3 My research with Bill Duncombe indicates some budgetary savings from school consolidation for very 
small districts, but I know of no study that documents such savings for service sharing or consolidation in 
other cases.  See W. Duncombe and J. Yinger, “The Benefits and Costs of School District Consolidation: 
What Recent Research Reveals about Potential Cost Savings,” The School Administrator, 5 (67) (May 
2010): 10-17.  Available at: http://www.aasa.org/SchoolAdministratorArticle.aspx?id=13218  
 
4 Again, see my November column: http://cpr.maxwell.syr.edu/efap/about_efap/ie/Nov13.pdf . 
 
5 Perhaps I also should not be surprised that H. Carl McCall, the other co-chair of this commission, supported these 
recommendations.  When he was the New York State Comptroller, Mr. McCall made the bizarre argument that 
“STAR should not be counted as school aid” because of the “diametrically opposed distributional patterns between 
STAR and school aid.” STAR is not school aid because it is unfair?  He also argued, as did Governor Pataki, that 
STAR was not part of the education finance system because its “purpose” was tax relief.  Whatever its purpose in 
the eyes of politicians, its effect is to distribute a large share of the state’s support for education in a wildly unfair 
manner.  See page 9 of H. Carl McCall, “School Finance Issues in the 1998-99 Enacted Budget,” June 1998, 
available at http://www.osc.state.ny.us/reports/schools/1998/enbred.pdf . Mr. McCall also cites a report by Bill 
Duncombe and me without explaining that our conclusions on these points are the opposite of his.  
 
 
                                                 
 
Perhaps I also should not be surprised that Governor Cuomo supports these provisions.  
After all, he appointed former-Governor Pataki as a co-chair of this commission, despite Pataki’s 
record, and he championed the tax cap that is so unfair to poor school districts.6   
 
But I keep hoping that New York’s politicians will recognize that they are cheating 
students in poor school districts and that the resulting lost skills penalize all citizens of New 
York State. 
 
One other key proposal in the commission report is to provide an income tax credit to 
manufacturing firms equal to 20 percent of their property tax payment.  What an ironic proposal.  
As several scholars have shown, Pataki’s STAR program created incentives that led to a 
substantial increase in property taxes on business property.7  The latest estimate by my 
colleagues and me is that STAR resulted in a 12.5 percent increase in the business property tax 
rate.  By making this proposal, Pataki appears to be trying to undo some of the damage that his 
STAR program caused.8   
 
However, the proposed manufacturing tax credit is unlikely to have the intended effect.  
A 20 percent cut in property taxes for manufacturing represents a gift to current manufacturing 
firms and will have little or no impact on decisions by manufacturing firms to move into or out 
of New York State.  A property tax cut (or it income-tax-credit equivalent) leads to an immediate 
increase in the value of manufacturing property and of land suitable for manufacturing 
establishments. As a result, manufacturing businesses thinking of moving into New York would 
face an increase in the cost of property that offset the decrease in their property taxes.  
Manufacturing businesses thinking of moving out of New York also might not be discouraged 
from leaving because the price of their property, which is what they receive if they leave, would 
go up.  New York does not need any more programs that give bonuses to current businesses 
without altering the conditions that promote economic development—such as a fairer education 
finance system. 
 
To develop more reasonable responses to the high property taxes in New York State, 
policy makers need to recognize that property tax rates are heavily influenced by other 
components of a state’s education finance system.  Most importantly, many scholars have shown 
that increases in state education aid lead to some combination of spending increases and property 
6 My November column also discussed the unfairness in New York State’s tax cap. 
  
7 See J. Rockoff, “Local Response to Fiscal Incentives in Heterogeneous Communities,” Journal of 
Urban Economics 68 (2) (September 2010), pp. 138-147 and T. H. Eom, W. Duncombe, P. Nguyen-
Hoang, and J. Yinger, “The Unintended Consequences of Property Tax Relief: New York’s STAR 
Program,” Working Paper, Syracuse University, November 2013. 
 
8 To add to the irony, recall that the design of the rebates gives voters an entirely new incentive to 
increase public spending by no less than 2 percent.  Will some future governor appoint Pataki to another 
commission so he can magnify the damage from this proposal, too? 
 
                                                 
tax cuts.  One survey concludes that foundation aid payments do stimulate spending, but “the 
bulk of the grant is still used for local tax reduction.”9 
 
Thus, the most effective way to cut property tax rates in poor school districts is to give 
them the education aid that was promised to them by the reforms that were passed in 2007.  Rich 
districts do not need more aid, of course; indeed, they currently receive more than their fair 
share. The best approach for these districts, is to ensure that voters have full information about 
the implications for property taxes when they vote on a school budget.  With full information and 
the current levy limit, further tax relief to rich districts is simply inappropriate. 
 
Anyone who believes in a fair and effective education finance system for New York State 
should strenuously oppose the recommendations of this commission and support a return to the 
2007 state education aid reforms. 
 
 
9 This quotation is from page 157 in R. C. Fisher and L. E. Papke, “Local Government Responses to 
Education Grants.” National Tax Journal 53 (1) (1999), pp. 153-168.  Using data from New York, Bill 
Duncombe and I found that $1 of aid resulted in $0.67 in property tax reductions. See W. Duncombe and 
J. Yinger, “School Finance Reform: Aid Formulas and Equity Objectives.” National Tax Journal 51 (2) 
(June 1998), pp. 239-262. 
 
 
                                                 
